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“Injustice Anywhere is a  
Threat to Justice Everywhere”
1
 
Internal vs. International Armed Conflicts: 
Should the Distinction be Eliminated? 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This article discusses international humanitarian 
law, particularly the Geneva Conventions and its 
Additional Protocols.  It analyzes the rights of protected 
persons under the Geneva Conventions, such as prisoners 
of war and civilians, as well as the obligations of States 
during armed conflicts.  Furthermore, the article points out 
the flaws in the Geneva Conventions, such as the 
discrepancy between the obligations of States during an 
international armed conflict vs. during an internal armed 
conflicts.  It argues that this distinction between 
international and internal armed conflicts should be 
                                                           
1
 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, April 
16, 1963, available at 
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html 
(Applying Dr. King’s quote referring to the civil rights issues in the 
United States during the 1960s, to international humanitarian law issues 
occurring in various countries in the world. The full quote reads: 
“Moreover, I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities 
and states. I cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about 
what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice 
everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied 
in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all 
indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow, 
provincial "outside agitator" idea. Anyone who lives inside the United 




eliminated and that States’ obligations should be the same 
for both conflicts. 
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 The Geneva Conventions are international treaties 
that govern the conduct of warfare, particularly the 
treatment of the victims of war.
1
  These Conventions 
distinguish international armed conflicts from non-
international armed conflicts, which is the cause of great 
concern in the field of international humanitarian law.
2
  The 
law that governs non-international armed conflicts, 
Common Article 3
3
 and Additional Protocol II,
4
 affords 
significantly less protections for the victims of war and 
                                                           
1
 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the 
Wounded and Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
2
 See Geneva Convention I supra note 2; Geneva Convention II 
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III supra note 2; Geneva Convention 
IV supra note 2. 
3
 Geneva Convention I, supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3116, 
3118, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32, 34; Geneva Convention II, supra note 2, art. 
3, 6 U.S.T. at 3220, 3222, 75 U.N.T.S. at 86, 88; Geneva Convention 
III, supra note 2, art. 3, 6 U.S.T at 3318, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136, 138; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War of August 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 
at 287 [hereinafter Common Article 3]. 
4
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, art. 4(2) (adopted June 8, 1977), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
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fails to provide for any enforcement mechanisms.  
However, victims of international armed conflicts receive 
an array of protections, and if grave breaches of these 





This distinction of internal and international armed 
conflicts results in a discrepancy in protections and 
prohibited acts, based on where the armed conflict occurs.  
The resolution of such problem is to eliminate the 
distinction and apply the laws of international armed 
conflicts to all armed conflicts, regardless of where the 
conflicts occur.  One should not receive less protection 
from the scourge of war, and one should not have impunity 
from heinous war crimes, simply because of the borders 
they are within.  These injustices inherent in internal armed 
conflicts are threats to justice and peace in the international 
community.  As such, internal conflicts should be treated as 
international conflicts.   
 
I. Background: International Humanitarian Law 
 
 International humanitarian law is simply the law of 
war.
6
  Although in war there seems to be the absence of law 
and only chaos, there are treaties
7
 and customary law
8
 that 
                                                           
5
 Geneva Convention I, supra note 2, art. 49, U.S.T. at 3146, 75 
U.N.T.S. at 62; Geneva Convention II, supra note 2, art 50, 6 U.S.T. at 
3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Geneva Convention III, supra note 2, art 
129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236; Geneva Convention IV, 
supra note 2, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386. 
6
 BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1033 (6th ed. 
2011). 
7
 For example the 1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects (CCW) or the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
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govern the conduct of warfare.  Even in ancient Greek 
mythology there was a distinction between Ares, the god of 
mere violence, and Athena, the Goddess of warfare, in 
which warfare was understood “as an organized, 
disciplined, rationally conducted collective activity.”
9
  
Therefore, this idea that warfare should be restrained by 
law is ancient.  
 
 The laws of war originate in the just war theory 
developed by the great thinkers of our past, Saint Augustine 
(354-430) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).
10
  The 
just war theory distinguishes between the justice of war, jus 
ad bellum, and the justice in war, jus in bello.
11
  Jus ad 
bellum determines when resort to war is just and unjust.
12
  
Historically, a just war required that the cause be just, that 
war be the last resort, that it be authorized by a lawful 
government, that the violence be proportional to the cause, 
that the war be fought with rightful intention rather than a 
mere pretext, and that the war carry a possibility of 
                                                                                                                    
Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty) are examples of these types of 
treaties. Convention on the Probation of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction, open for signature Dec. 3, 1977, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211; 
Convention on Probations or Restrictions of the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed Excessively Injurious or 
to have Indiscriminate Effects, open for signature Apr. 10 1981, 1342 
U.N.T.S. 137.  
8
 DAVID LUBAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 1039 (2010) (stating that the four bedrock principles of 
the rules of warfare are noncombatant immunity, proportionality, 
necessity, and no unnecessary suffering).  
9
 STEVEN C. NEFF, WAR AND LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL 
HISTORY 16 (2005).  
10
 GREGORY M. REICHBERG ET AL., THE ETHICS OF WAR: CLASSIC 
AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS (2006). 
11
 LUBAN, supra note 9, at 1039. 
12





  Since World War II, jus ad bellum is governed 
by the United Nations (UN) Charter, Article 2(4), which 
bans “the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state.”
14
  
However, there are exceptions to Article 2(4), which allow 
war in cases of self-defense (Article 51) or when the UN 
Security Council authorizes it, provided they find a threat 





 Jus in bello, on the other hand, determines whether 
combatants are fighting justly or unjustly.
16
  There are four 
main principles that govern jus in bello: The principle of 
distinction, the principle of proportionality, the principle of 
necessity, and the principle to avoid unnecessary 
suffering.
17
  The principle of distinction, or noncombatant 
immunity, distinguishes between civilians and combatants, 
in that combatants may be directly attacked, whereas 
civilians may not.
18
  However, civilians are only protected 
against direct attack “unless and for such time as they take 
direct part in hostilities.”
19
  In addition, combatants that 
have surrendered or become hors de combat (outside of 





 It is inevitable that some civilians will become 
collateral damage and be killed during war.  However, 
                                                           
13
 Id.  
14
 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4; LUBAN, supra note 9, at 1040. 
15
 Id. at arts. 42, 51. 
16
 LUBAN, supra note 9, at 1040. 
17
 LUBAN, supra note 9, at 1040-42. 
18
 Id. at 1041 (citing J.I. HENCKAERTS ET AL., CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR 3 (2005)).  
19
 Id. (citing J.I. HENCKAERTS ET AL., CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR 3 (2005)).  
20
 Id. at 1040.  
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collateral damage is permitted provided it is unintentional 
and is proportional to the military goals of such attack.
21
  
This is known as the principle of proportionality.
22
  The 
next principle is the principle of necessity, which states that 
no violence is permitted unless militarily necessary, that is, 
unless it contributes to overcoming the enemy.
23
  Lastly, 
there is a principle to avoid any unnecessary suffering, 
which states that no violence is permitted that would inflict 
suffering for its own sake.
24
  The result of combatants 
complying with these jus in bello principles is that they 
receive belligerent privilege or immunity, and they will not 
incur criminal liability for killing or injuring the enemy, or 




 Today, international humanitarian law is primarily 
governed by “Hague law” and “Geneva law,” as well as 
numerous treaties on specific subjects, such as prohibited 
weapons.
26
  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) has been essential in the creation and maintenance 
of international humanitarian law.  The ICRC was founded 
in 1859, when a Swiss businessman, Henri Dunant, visited 
a battlefield after the Battle of Solferino during the Second 
War of Italian Independence.
27
  Appalled by the conditions 
of the wounded and dying men abandoned on the field and 
moaning in pain, Dunant founded the ICRC to aid and 
assist the victims of war.
28
  In addition, the ICRC lobbied 
states to negotiate treaties regulating the conduct of war.
29
  
As a result, various states met at The Hague in 1899, and 
                                                           
21






 Id.  
25
 Id. at 1041-42.  
26
 Id. at 1043 
27
 Id. at 1042.  
28
 Id.  
29
 Id.  
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again in 1907, to adopt The Hague Conventions, which 
codified the rules of war and most importantly, established 
the principle that the right of combatants to injury the 
enemy is not unlimited.
30
  These conventions are often 
referred to as “Hague law.”
31
  In 1949, again with the help 
of the ICRC, the Geneva Conventions were adopted to 
further specify the rules of war.
32
  Since then, the ICRC has 
become a major interpreter of international humanitarian 
law and its commentaries on the Geneva Conventions have 
“semi-official standing.”
33
  The Geneva Conventions were 
a significant development in the field of international 
humanitarian law.  
 
II. The Geneva Conventions 
 
After World War II, states met in Geneva, 
Switzerland and adopted the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949.
34
  These Conventions regulate the treatment of 
“protected persons,” which are civilians and hors de 
combat, such as prisoners of war or sick and wounded 
combatants.
35
  The first Geneva Convention deals with 
wounded and sick soldiers in the field, while the second 
deals with the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea.
36
  
The third deals with the treatment of prisoners of war 
(POWs) and the fourth with the protection of civilians.
37
  
                                                           
30
 Id. at 1043.  
31
 Id. at 1043. 
32
 Id.  
33




 Geneva Convention I, supra note 2; Geneva Convention II, 
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 2; Geneva Convention 
IV, supra note 2. 
36
 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 2; Geneva Convention II, 
supra note 2. 
37
 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 2; Geneva Convention 
IV, supra note 2. 
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The Geneva Conventions also distinguish between 
international armed conflicts and armed conflicts not of an 
international character, non-international or internal armed 
conflicts.
38
  Article 3, common to all Geneva Conventions, 
is the only provision that applies in non-international armed 
conflicts, whereas the rest of the provisions apply to 
international armed conflicts.
39
  In 1977, two additional 
protocols were adopted to supplement the Geneva 
Conventions and expand the protections of the victims of 
war.
40
  These protocols also distinguished between 
international and non-international armed conflicts – 
Additional Protocol I only applied to international armed 





Because the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions depends on the type of armed conflict, it is 
important to note when an armed conflict is international 
and when it is non-international.  An “international” armed 
conflict requires that two or more states be involved in the 
armed conflict.
42
  In the reverse, a “non-international” 
armed conflict is an armed conflict that is not between two 
states, that is to say, an armed conflict within a state, such 
as a civil war or insurgency.
43
  This distinction is 
significant because there are far more protections for those 
in international armed conflicts.   
 
 
                                                           
38
 See Geneva Convention I supra note 2; Geneva Convention II 
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III supra note 2; Geneva Convention 
IV supra note 2. 
39
 Common Article 3, supra note 4.  
40
 LUBAN, supra note 9, at 1043. 
41
 Id.  
42
 Id. at 1044 & n. 3. 
43
 Id. at 1060. 
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A. “Grave Breaches” 
 
 The rules in the Geneva Conventions for 
international armed conflicts are extensive and complex, 
and therefore, our focus will only be on the violations that 
amount to grave breaches.  “Grave breaches” are the most 
serious war crimes and core violations common to all four 
Geneva Conventions.
44
  The grave breaches are, “any of the 
following acts, if committed against persons or property 
protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or 
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, 
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body 
or health.”
45
  Geneva Conventions I, II, and IV also add 
“extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully 
and wantonly”
46
 to the list of grave breaches.  Other grave 
breaches include compelling prisoners of war (Geneva 
Convention III) or protected persons (Geneva Convention 
IV) to serve in the forces of a hostile power, and willfully 
depriving prisoners of war (Geneva Convention III) or 
protected persons (Geneva Convention IV) of their rights to 
a fair and regular trial.
47
  Geneva Convention IV further 
declares that unlawful deportation or confinement of a 
                                                           
44
 Id. at 1047.  
45
 Geneva Convention I, supra note 2, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3196, 75 
U.N.T.S. at 62; Geneva Convention II, supra note 2, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. at 
3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Geneva Convention III, supra note 2, art. 
130, 6 U.S.T. at 3420, 75 U.N.T.S. at 238; Geneva Convention IV, 
supra note 2, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388. 
46
 Geneva Convention I, supra note 2, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3196, 75 
U.N.T.S. at 62; Geneva Convention II, supra note 2, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. at 
3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 
147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388. 
47
 Geneva Convention III, supra note 2, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. at 3420, 
75 U.N.T.S. at 238; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 147, 6 
U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388. 
195 
 





 Each state is required to criminalize grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions domestically, giving states 
universal jurisdiction over these specific violations.
49
  
States must “enact any legislation necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or 
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches.”
50
  In 
addition, each state has an “obligation to search for persons 
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be 
committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such 
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own 
courts” or “hand such persons over for trial to another High 
Contracting Party.”
51
  This concept is also known as the 
“try or extradite” principle or aut dedere aut judicare.
52
  
Furthermore, all Geneva Conventions provide that no state 
party can be absolved of any liability incurred in regards to 





 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
not only expanded the protections applicable in 
international armed conflict, but also expanded the list of 
                                                           
48
 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 
75 U.N.T.S. at 388. 
49
 See Geneva Convention I supra note 2; Geneva Convention II 
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III supra note 2; Geneva Convention 
IV supra note 2. 
50
 See Geneva Convention I supra note 2; Geneva Convention II 
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III supra note 2; Geneva Convention 
IV supra note 2. 
51
 See Geneva Convention I supra note 2; Geneva Convention II 
supra note 2; Geneva Convention III supra note 2; Geneva Convention 
IV supra note 2. 
52
 CARTER, supra note 7, at 1120. 
53
 Id. at 1117. 
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“grave breaches” that give rise to universal jurisdiction.
54
  
For example, Additional Protocol I added to the list of 
grave breaches prohibitions of acts, such as: making 
protected persons the object of attack, perfidious use of the 
red cross emblem, unjustifiable delay in repatriation of 
protected persons, apartheid and other inhuman and 
degrading practices involving outrages upon personal 
dignity, attacks on historic monuments, works of art, or 
places of worship.
55
  In addition, Additional Protocol I 
states, “[a]ny willful act or omission which seriously 
endangers the physical or mental health or integrity of any 
person who is in the power of a Party other than the one on 
which he depends…shall be a grave breach of this 
Protocol.”
56
  While all provisions in the Geneva 
Conventions apply to international armed conflicts, only 
one article in the Geneva Conventions applies to non-




B. Common Article 3 
 
 Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions, 
is specifically concerned with armed conflicts not of an 
international character, and is the only provision in the 
Conventions related to such internal conflicts.
58
  Common 
Article 3 provides: 
 
                                                           
54
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted by June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 41-42 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
55
 Id.  
56
 Id. at art. 11, para. 4. 
57
 Common Article 3, supra note 4.  
58
 Anthony Cullen, The Parameters of Internal Armed Conflict in 
International humanitarian law, 12 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
189, 193 (2004). 
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In the case of armed conflict not of 
an international character occurring 
in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, each Party to 
the conflict shall be bound to 
apply, as a minimum, the following 
provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in 
the hostilities, including members 
of armed forces who have laid 
down their arms and those placed ' 
hors de combat ' by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other 
cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any 
adverse distinction founded on 
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, 
birth or wealth, or any other similar 
criteria.  To this end, the following 
acts are and shall remain prohibited 
at any time and in any place 
whatsoever with respect to the 
above-mentioned persons: (a) 
violence to life and person, in 
particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture;  (b) taking of hostages; (c) 
outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; (d) the 
passing of sentences and the 
carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by 
a regularly constituted court, 
affording all the judicial guarantees 
198 
 
which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be 
collected and cared for.  An 
impartial humanitarian body, such 
as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, may offer its 
services to the Parties to the 
conflict.  The Parties to the conflict 
should further endeavour to bring 
into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other 
provisions of the present 
Convention.  The application of the 
preceding provisions shall not 





These protections are significantly less protective 
than those protections given in an international armed 
conflict.  However, states attempted to fix this issue by 
adopting Additional Protocol II in 1977.
60
   
 
C. Additional Protocol II 
 
 Similar to Common Article 3, the Additional 
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions only applies to 
armed conflicts of non-international character.
61
  
Additional Protocol II was intended to supplement 
Common Article 3 and advance the protections of persons 
                                                           
59
 Common Article 3, supra note 4. 
60
 Cullen, supra note 59, at 199.  
61
 Charles Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol II and its Relation to 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other 
Human Rights Instruments, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 9, 25 (1983). 
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taking no active part in hostilities.
62
  Additional Protocol II 
includes all of the Common Article 3 protections and adds: 
order that there shall be no survivors, violence to the health 
and physical or mental well-being of persons, corporal 
punishment, collective punishments, acts of terrorism, rape, 
enforced prostitution, indecent assault, slavery, slave trade, 
pillage, and threats to commit any of the foregoing acts, to 
the list of prohibited acts towards protected persons.
63
   
 
Children receive special protections in Protocol II, 
whereas they did not in Common Article 3.  Although 
children may have fallen under Common Article 3 
protections as persons taking no active part in hostilities, 
Additional Protocol II extends protections specifically for 
children and creates affirmative obligations regarding the 
treatment of children.
64
  For example, children under the 
age of fifteen years shall not be recruited in the armed 
forces or groups, and should they take part in hostilities and 
are captured, children under the age of fifteen are still 
afforded special protection.
65
  Also, those facing 
punishment of criminal offenses related to the armed 
conflict under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense 
shall not be given the death penalty.
66
  Additionally, there 
are affirmative obligations to: provide children with care 
and aid, facilitate the reunion of families temporarily 
separated, and to remove children temporarily from areas 




Those, whose liberty has been restricted, such as 
people interned or detained, also receive more protections 




 Additional Protocol II, supra note 5, at art. 4(2). 
64
 Id. at art. 4(3)(c)-(d). 
65
 Id.  
66
 Id. at art. 6(4). 
67
 Id. at art. 4(3)(b),(e). 
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under Additional Protocol II.
68
  These protected persons 
shall “be provided with food and drinking water and be 
afforded safeguards as regards health and hygiene and 
protection against the rigors of the climate and the dangers 
of the armed conflict . . . allowed to practi[c]e their religion 
. . . if made to work, have the benefit of working conditions 
and safeguards . . . allowed to send and receive letters and 
cards . . . have the benefit of medical examinations,” among 
other protections.
69
  Additional Protocol II also expanded 
upon the safeguards required during prosecutions and 
punishment of criminal offenses related to the armed 
conflict, and encourages authorities in power at the end of 
hostilities to “grant the broadest possible amnesty to 




The most important advances of Additional 
Protocol II are the specific protections for civilian 
populations.  Generally, civilian populations shall not be 
the object of attack, and “[a]cts or threats of violence[,] the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the 
civilian population[,] are prohibited.”
71
   Starvation of 
civilians as a weapon of war is prohibited.  As such, it is 
prohibited to “attack, destroy, remove or render useless for 
that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas 
for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking 
water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”
72
  
Attacks against “historic monuments, works of art or places 
of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage 
of peoples . . .” are prohibited.
73
  Displacement of civilian 
                                                           
68
 Id. at art. 5(1)-(2). 
69
 Id.  
70
 Id. at art. 6. 
71
 Id. at art. 13(2).  
72
 Id. at art. 14. 
73
 Id. at art. 16. 
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populations shall not be ordered, unless the civilians’ 
security is at risk or military necessity demands it, and in 
such case, conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and 
nutrition must be satisfactory.
74
  Additionally, the 
protection and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, 
as well as medical and religious personnel, was also 
extended in Additional Protocol II.
75
  Although Additional 
Protocol II expanded protections afforded in non-
international conflicts, there are still many issues with 
international humanitarian law in non-international armed 
conflicts. 
 
III. The Problem: International Humanitarian Law in 
Non-international Armed Conflicts  
 
The distinction between international and non-
international armed conflicts in international humanitarian 
law is a growing problem.  Steven Solomon, the Principal 
Legal Officer of the World Health Organization, agrees.  
He says, “[s]imply put, conduct which was prohibited in 
international warfare was not specifically prohibited in 
internal warfare.  There was, in a word, a gap in the law 
and, consequently, a gap in the protections available for 
those caught up in non-international armed conflicts.”
76
  
One of the problems with international humanitarian law 
for non-international armed conflicts is the difficulty of the 
applying Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.
77
  
Another problem is that protected persons, particularly 
combatants that are captured, in non-international armed 
                                                           
74
 Id. at art. 17. 
75
 Id. at arts. 7-12. 
76
 Steven Solomon, Internal Conflicts: Dilemmas and 
Developments, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 579, 580 (2006). 
77
 Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of 
Internal Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL. 
L. REV. 66, 67 (2005). 
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conflicts receive fewer protections than those of 
international armed conflicts.
78
  But the most significant 
problem is the lack of enforcement mechanisms in 
international humanitarian law for non-international armed 
conflicts.
79
   
 
A. The Applicability of Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II 
 
It is difficult to determine exactly when Common 
Article 3 applies to a situation.  Common Article 3 does not 
set out any standards to determine when an internal armed 
conflict is occurring and therefore there are no standards 
determining its applicability.  This is an issue because the 
recognition of the existence of an armed conflict is then left 
to the discretion of the state hosting the conflict.
80
  
Therefore, the implementation of Common Article 3 is 
based on the willingness of that state to recognize the 
armed conflict.  Should the state refuse to recognize the 
armed conflict, it avoids application of Common Article 
3.
81
  Thus, the problem is that “[i]ndividual states are . . . 
left with a carte blanche to decide when . . . [C]ommon 
Article 3 should be invoked.”
82
  States are unlikely to 
recognize an armed conflict because it would limit the use 
of repressive measures in which the state could employ to 
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  This results in Common Article 3 
not applying in many situations in which it should.  
 
Although Additional Protocol II has more 
protections than Common Article 3, as previously 
discussed, its application is much more limited than that of 
Common Article 3.
84
  Additional Protocol II is limited to 
armed conflicts between High Contracting Parties’ armed 
forces and “dissent armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations.”
85
  There 
is no language in Common Article 3 stipulating as to the 
type of armed forces required for its application–it only 
requires that there simply be an “armed conflict” within the 
territory of a High Contracting Party.
86
  Furthermore, 
Additional Protocol II “shall not apply to situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated 





In Prosecutor v. Tadić, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) defined armed 
conflict, with regard to internal armed conflicts, as 
“protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a State.”
88
  Therefore, there is a higher 
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threshold to trigger the application of Additional Protocol II 
than there is for Common Article 3.  Not only must the 
armed groups be “organized,” but they must be “under 
responsible command” and “exercise such control over a 
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations.”
89
  Therefore, not all 
cases of non-international armed conflicts will be covered 
by Additional Protocol II.  For example, Additional 
Protocol II will “probably not operate in a civil war until 
the rebels [are] well established and [have] set up some 
form of de facto government.”
90
  In addition, only 166 
countries are state parties to Additional Protocol II, 
compared to the 194 state-parties to the Geneva 
Conventions; therefore, the Additional Protocol II applies 
in fewer states than the Geneva Conventions.
91
  The 
inability to trigger the application of these instruments 
leaves victims of non-international armed conflicts without 
protection. 
 
B. No Status for Combatants  
 
 Even when Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II are triggered, combatants in non-international 
armed conflicts do not receive as much protections as 
combatants in international armed conflicts.  Unlike 
combatants in international armed conflicts, combatants in 
non-international armed conflicts do not receive belligerent 
privilege or immunity, nor do they receive prisoner of war 
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(POW) status if captured.
92
  This refusal to recognize such 
a status for combatants in internal armed conflicts is 
exemplified by the provision in Common Article 3 
declaring that it “shall not affect the legal status of the 
Parties to the conflict.”
93
  The ICRC, commenting on this 
provision, confirms the lack of status for combatants of 
non-international armed conflicts, stating that “the Article 
does not give [the adverse party] any right to special 
protection or any immunity, whatever it may be and 
whatever title it may give itself or claim.”
94
  As you may 
recall, belligerent privilege or immunity means that the 
combatant may not be held criminally liable for killing or 
injuring the enemy during an armed conflict, but can only 
be held accountable for gross violations of international 
humanitarian law.
95
  Without such belligerent immunity, 
combatants in internal armed conflicts may be prosecuted 
and punished for violating any national laws during the 
conflict, unlike combatants in international armed 
conflicts.
96
  Common Article 3 does not affect the legal or 
political treatment that the combatant may receive as a 
result of his behavior, that is, the article doesn’t affect the 
state’s right to prosecute, try and sentence adverse 
combatants for their crimes, according to its national 
laws.
97
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In addition to not receiving belligerent immunity, 
combatants in non-international armed conflicts are not 
extended POW status if captured during the conflict.
98
  
Whereas all of the protections in the Geneva Convention III 
regarding the treatment of POWs apply to captured 
combatants of international armed conflicts, none of these 
protections are afforded to combatants captured in internal 
armed conflicts.
99
  For example, POWs must be detained 
under special conditions and at the end of the conflict 
POWs must be repatriated, whereas captured combatants in 
non-international armed conflicts are not required to be 




In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court of the 
United States discussed which Geneva Convention 
protections applied to Hamdan, who was captured in 2001 
during hostilities in Afghanistan.
101
  The Court found the 
conflict to which Hamdan was involved to be “not of an 
international character” because this particular incident 
involved al Qaeda, a non-state actor, rather than the armed 
forces of Afghanistan, which would have made the conflict 
an international one.
102
  Thus, the Court found that 
Common Article 3 applied to the situation.  However, the 
Court noted that the article provides less protection for 
Hamdan than the rest of the Geneva Conventions, stating, 
“Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal 
protection, falling short of full protection under the 
Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a 
signatory nor even a non-signatory who are involved in a 
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conflict ‘in the territory of’ a signatory.’”
103
  The case 
focused specifically on the judicial proceedings and 
guarantees required by Common Article 3.  Common 
Article 3(1)(d) prohibits “the passing of sentences and the 
carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all 
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.”
104
  Although Common 
Article 3 does not define the terms of this requirement, the 
Court understood the requirement to mean “at least the 
barest of those trial protections that have been recognized 
by customary law.”
105
  The Court in the Hamdan case 
continued, saying that, “Common Article 3 obviously 
tolerates a great degree of flexibility in trying individuals 
captured during armed conflict; its requirements are general 
ones.”
106
  The Hamdan case exemplifies the lack of 
protection, particularly judicial guarantees, provided to 
captured combatants in non-international armed conflicts. 
Captured combatants in non-international armed conflicts 
are also at a higher risk of harsh treatment while detained.  
Captured combatants in non-international armed conflicts 
are protected from “violence to life and person, in 
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture . . . outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment” under 
Common Article 3.
107
  However, POWs in an international 
conflict are protected from “willful killing, torture or 
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, 
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body 
or health” under Article 130 and from “[a]ny unlawful act 
or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or 
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seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its 
custody . . . physical mutilation or medical or scientific 
experiments of any kind . . . acts of violence or intimidation 
and against insults and public curiosity . . . [and] measures 
of reprisal against prisoners of war” under Article 13 of the 
Geneva Convention III, regarding the treatment of 
POWs.
108
  POWs in international conflicts receive 
extensive protections compared to combatants of non-
international conflicts.  As such, even omissions that could 
endanger the health of POWs and acts of intimidation are 
violations of the Geneva Conventions.
109
  In addition, the 
ICRC has permission to visit POWs in international 
conflicts to ensure compliance, whereas in non-
international conflicts, the ICRC can merely offer its 




This lack of status for combatants in non-
international armed conflicts is an issue because these 
combatants receive all the burdens of being a combatant 
without any of the benefits of being a combatant.  The 
burden is that these combatants do not receive civilian 
status and therefore may be directly targeted.
111
  But these 
same combatants are still not given the benefit of POW 
status and all the protections that follow such status if 
captured.  Therefore, combatants in non-international 
armed conflicts have no incentive to abide by the rules of 
war; they are neither protected nor restrained.
112
   
 
 
                                                           
108
 Geneva Convention III, supra note 2, at art. 130. 
109
 Id.  
110
 Common Article 3, supra note 4.  
111
 Common Article 3, supra note 4; LUBAN, supra note 9, at 1040-
41 (citing J.I. HENCKAERTS ET AL., CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF WAR 3 (2005)). 
112
 Lopez, supra note 79, at 934.  
209 
 
C. Failure to Enforce 
 
 The most significant failure of Common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II is that they lack an enforcement 
clause.  While the Geneva Conventions for international 
armed conflicts require states to “enact any legislation 
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions” and “bring 
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own 
courts” or “hand such persons over for trial to another,” 
neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II call 
for such action in non-international armed conflicts.
113
  
Thus, states are not required to prosecute war criminals in 
non-international armed conflicts, like they are required to 
in international armed conflict.  In fact, there is not even an 
article stating that parties shall ensure the observance of 
Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II.
114
  However, 
all Geneva Conventions include an article that requires 
state parties to “undertake to respect and to ensure respect 
for the present Convention in all circumstances.”
115
   
On the contrary, Common Article 3 states that it “shall not 
affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.”
116
  
ICRC commentary suggests that this provision means that 
Common Article 3 “is in no way concerned with the 
internal affairs of States” and “does not limit in any way 
the Government’s right to suppress a rebellion using all the 
means – including arms – provided for under its own 
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  The result is that, not only are violators going 
unpunished, but also the parties are encouraged to engage 
in measures that violate international humanitarian law, 
thinking that they will not be held accountable.   
 
 The enforcement of Additional Protocol II is not 
any better than that of Common Article 3.  Additional 
Protocol II not only promotes impunity with the lack of an 
enforcement provisions, but also encourages granting 
amnesty for criminal offenses related to the armed conflict.  
Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II states that, “the 
authorities in power shall endeavor to grant the broadest 
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the 
armed conflict.”
118
  However, a state party in international 
armed conflicts is not allowed to absolve itself or any other 
state of any liability incurred for grave breaches, such as 
granting amnesty.
119
  Furthermore, Additional Protocol II 
has an article dedicated specifically to the principle of non-
intervention.  Article 3 of Additional Protocol II declares: 
(1) Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the 
purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the 
responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, 
to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to 
defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the 
State.  (2) Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a 
justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or 
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external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the 




Thus, Additional Protocol II cannot be used as a 
pretext or justification to intervene in an internal armed 
conflict.
121
  States are discouraged from prosecuting war 
criminals in internal armed conflicts and are prohibited 
from intervening to help the victims of internal armed 
conflicts.     
 
IV. Resolution: No Distinction  
 
 In 1977, during the Diplomatic Conference which 
produced the Additional Protocols, Norway proposed that 
there should no longer be a distinction between 
international and non-international armed conflicts.
122
  This 
proposal was based on the idea that “victims in all 
situations of armed conflict, whatever their nature, are 
subject to the same suffering and should be helped in the 
same way.”
123
  From 1990 to 2000, there were fifty-three 
non-international conflicts and just three international 
armed conflicts.
124
  There continues to be significantly 
more non-international armed conflicts in the world than 
there are international armed conflicts.  So, today there are 
more victims of war with less protection than when the 
Geneva Conventions were created and when international 
armed conflicts were more prevalent.  This result cannot 
possibly be the intent of international humanitarian law, or 
the intent of the states when they gathered at Geneva in 
1949.  The way to resolve this issue, as the Norwegians 
                                                           
120
 Common Article 3, supra note 4.  
121
 Id.  
122
 Solomon, supra note 77, at 581.  
123
 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 1328 n. 31.  
124
 Solomon, supra note 77, at 579.  
212 
 
proposed, is to no longer distinguish non-international from 
international armed conflicts.
125
  International humanitarian 
law of international armed conflicts should then be applied 
to all armed conflicts, regardless of where the conflict 
occurs and by whom the conflict is fought. 
 
 How can the elimination of this distinction be 
effectuated?  International law is created either by 
international conventions or treaties and international 
custom, a general practice accepted as law.
126
  It is highly 
unlikely that states would agree to amend the Geneva 
Conventions or adopt a new instrument that would 
eliminate this distinction because such actions would 
threaten their sovereignty.
127
  This is evidenced by the lack 
of signatories (including the United States) to Additional 
Protocol II, which sought to extend protections to victims 
of internal armed conflicts.
128
  The Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law defines customary international law 
as resulting “from a general and consistent practice of 
states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation.”
129
  Although it is argued that Common Article 
3 is considered customary international law, there is no 
evidence that the rest of the provisions in the Geneva 
Conventions–those applying to international conflicts–have 
been applied to internal armed conflicts.  In order for the 
elimination of the distinction to become customary law, 
states must apply international humanitarian law of 
international conflicts to their internal conflicts in a 
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consistent way, and do this in the belief that they are legally 
obligated to.
130
  However, states have been reluctant to take 
the steps necessary to effectuate the elimination of the 
distinction by way of custom.  For example, in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the United States refused to give a combatant of 
a non-international conflict any more protections than what 
was required by Common Article 3.
131
  So we must ask, is 
there a higher law that can govern this issue? 
 
A. Saving All Victims from the Scourge of All Wars 
 
The United Nations (UN) Charter declared that the 
peoples of the UN are “determined to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war . . . and to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations large and small.”
132
  Notice that in the UN 
Charter–which is arguably the constitution of the world and 
at the top of the hierarchy of international conventions–
there is no distinction between international wars or non-
international wars.  Stated simply, the purpose of the UN is 
to save people from “the scourge of war” in general, 
implying all wars.
133
   
 
The Charter goes on to reaffirm the “dignity and 
worth of the human person,” that is to say all people.
134
  
Additionally, the Charter notes the equality of “nations 
large and small,” further eliminating a distinction based on 
geography.
135
  If the ultimate goal of all states in the world 
is to save all people from the scourge of all wars in all 
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territories, why is there a difference in the protection of 
these people depending on the type of war or where it is 
fought?  Logically, a distinction does not make sense.   
Furthermore, Article 103 of the Charter states, “[i]n the 
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members 
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”
136
  
Thus, the Charter trumps any treaty provisions inconsistent 
with its purpose and principles, such as Common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II, which claims there is a 
distinction between the international and internal wars, and 
the protections afforded in each.   
 
B. Internal Conflicts are International Conflicts  
 
Another way to eliminate the distinction between 
international and internal armed conflict is through creative 
interpretation.  The UN’s purpose is “[t]o maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.”
137
  
Under Chapter VII, the UN Security Council determines 
when a threat to or breach of international peace and 
security exists and then decides which measures to take, 
whether it involves armed force (Article 42) or not (Article 
41).
138
   
 
Throughout history, the Security Council has 
declared many internal conflicts as threats to and breaches 
of international peace, and continues to do so.  In 1993, the 
Security Council, in response to the internal armed conflict 
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occurring in Yugoslavia, adopted Resolutions 808 and 827, 
both “[d]etermining that this situation constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security.”
139
  A year later, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 955, declaring the 
internal conflict in Rwanda as constituting a threat to 
international peace and security.
140
  The Security Council 
declared the internal conflict in Darfur, Sudan a threat to 
international peace and security in multiple resolutions.
141
  
And in 2011, the Security Council declared the internal 
conflict in Libya as constituting a threat to international 




It is clear that internal conflicts can rise to the 
degree constituting a threat to international peace and 
security, calling for international measures to be taken.  
Therefore, it be said that such internal conflicts become 
international conflicts when they threaten or breach 
international peace and security.  By threatening the peace 
and security of other states, internal conflicts become a 
problem for other states, thus becoming an international 
conflict.  International humanitarian law of international 
conflicts can then be applied to the situation. 
 
 From the time that the Geneva Conventions were 
adopted in 1949 until the present, the world has become 
more globalized and states have increasingly become more 
interconnected and dependent upon each other.  President 
Mohammed Bedjaoui in the advisory opinion on the 
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Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
discusses this issue:  
 
It scarcely needs to be said 
that the face of contemporary 
international society is 
markedly altered . . . the 
progress made in terms of the 
institutionalization, not to say 
integration and 
“globalization”, of 
international society is 
undeniable. Witness the 
proliferation of international 
organizations, the gradual 
substitution of an 
international law of co-
operation for the traditional 
international law of co-
existence, the emergence of 
the concept of “international 
community” . . . A token of 
all these developments is the 
place which international law 
now accords to concepts such 
as obligations erga omnes, 
rules of jus cogens, or the 
common heritage of 
mankind. The resolutely 
positivist, voluntarist 
approach of international law 
still current at the beginning 
of the century… has been 
replaced by an objective 
conception of international 
law, a law more readily 
217 
 
seeking to reflect a collective 
juridical conscience and 
respond to the social 
necessities of States 




So, a conflict in one state will inevitably affect other 
states because of their interconnectedness, and possibly the 
international community as a whole.  Thus, an armed 
conflict in one state is a conflict in other states, making 
such a conflict an international one.  Internal conflicts are 
international conflicts, and should be treated as such. 
 
C. All States Owe a Duty during Internal Armed 
Conflicts 
 
Some rules by their very nature are “the concern of 
all states,” and thus, “all states can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection.”
144
  Such rules are referred to as 
obligations erga omnes, and each state owes a duty to the 
international community as a whole to fulfill such 
obligations.
145
  Because all states owe a duty to the 
international community with regard to these obligations 
and all states have an interest their observance, matters 
involving such obligations are no longer solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the state in question.
146
   
 
The ICRC, commenting on Geneva Convention IV 
regarding the protection of civilians, stated that “the spirit 
which inspires the Geneva Conventions naturally makes it 
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desirable that they should be applicable ‘erga omnes.’”
147
  
In addition, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its 
advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory and its judgment in the Case Concerning Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), declared international 
humanitarian law as having obligations erga omnes.
148
   
Obligations erga omnes are so significant that Judge Bruno 
Simma, in his separate opinion in the Case Concerning 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, believed 
that: 
If the international 
community allowed such 
interest to erode in the face 
not only of violations of 
obligations erga omnes but of 
outright attempts to do away 
with these fundamental 
duties, and in their place to 
open black holes in the law in 
which human beings may be 
“disappeared” and deprived 
of any legal protection 
whatsoever for indefinite 
periods of time, then 
international law, for me, 
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Therefore, the obligations delegated by international 
humanitarian law are so important that they concern all 
states, all states have an interest in them, and all states owe 
such obligations to all other states.  For such fundamental 
obligations, it seems strange that such obligations would 
vary depending on the type of circumstances involved, in 
this case the type of armed conflict involved.  Furthermore, 
if the protection of civilians during war and the special 
treatment of POWs are so essential as to be the concern of 
all states, the lack of such protection or special treatment in 
non-international conflicts would seem to defeat the 
purpose of making them erga omnes obligations.  In order 
to properly fulfill the obligations erga omnes of 
international humanitarian law, the rules governing 
international armed conflicts must be applied to all armed 




 By their nature, the protections afforded to victims 
of war and the prohibited acts in warfare are of 
international concern and interest.  Thus, the absence of 
these protections and the occurrence of such prohibited acts 
in internal armed conflicts, create a conflict for the 
international community as a whole.  As such, internal 
armed conflicts should be treated like international armed 
conflict, in which all provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
apply.  There should be no distinction between 
international and internal armed conflicts when it comes to 
the application of international humanitarian law.  War is 
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horrific no matter where it occurs and victims of internal 
armed conflicts suffer as much as victims of international 
armed conflicts.  The outdated notion that victims of war 
should receive less protection, and that perpetrators of war 
crimes should go free, merely because the armed conflict 
was internal to one state, is an injustice to that state and 
those victims.  Such injustice is a threat to all states and to 
the stability of the international community, and therefore 
should no longer be tolerated. 
